Conveners
Information Economics III
- Silvana Krasteva
- Huiyi Guo
Description
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Alex Smolin (Toulouse School of Economics, France) and Takuro Yamashita (Osaka University, Japan) : Information Design in Concave Games
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Weicheng Min (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China) and Florian Ederer (Yale School of Management, USA) : Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
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Shuguang Zhu (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China) and Takuro Yamashita (Osaka University, Japan) : Bayesian Persuasion Followed by Receiverโs Mechanism Design
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Huiyi Guo (Texas A&M University, USA) and Wei He (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China) : Optimal Persuasion with Sequential Private Information
