Conveners
Public Finance and Mechanism Design
- Piotr Dworczak
Description
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Pawel Doligalski (University of Bristol & GRAPE, UK/Poland), Filip Tokarski (Stanford, USA), Joanna Krysta (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland) and Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern & GRAPE, USA/ Poland): Weak separability and optimal redistribution: A mechanism-design approach
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Nicolas Werquin (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Toulouse School of Economics, and CEPR, USA) and Christian Hellwig (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR, France): A Fair Dayโs Pay for a Fair Dayโs Work: Optimal Tax Design as Redistributional Arbitrage
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Ilia Krasikov (Univ. of Chicago & HSE University, USA) and Mikhail Golosov (Univ. of Chicago, USA): The Optimal Taxation of Couples
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Stephane Gauthier (PSE, France) and Guy Laroque (Sciences Po, France): Random taxation and redistribution
